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NOTE
In the Nick of Time: Using the Reasonable Promptness
Provision to Challenge Medicaid Spending Cutbacks
Jeffrey Chen
Abstract:
Because agency enforcement of the Medicaid statute against non-compliant
states is utterly impractical, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have relied on
§ 1983 litigation to protect themselves against the harmful effects of state
cutbacks on Medicaid spending by privately enforcing two particular provisions
of the Medicaid statute against the states. However, because of several legislative
and judicial decisions, private litigants can no longer use these provisions to
challenge low Medicaid reimbursement rates. This Note proposes and evaluates
an alternative method of resisting state Medicaid spending cutbacks: enforcing
the Reasonable Promptness Provision of the Medicaid statute through § 1983.
* J.D. expected 2016 from the Yale Law School. I would like to thank Professor Abbe Gluck
for her relentless guidance and encouragement during the development of this idea; Sarah Grusin
for her extraordinary generosity in allowing me to tap into her vast knowledge of Medicaid
litigation; Claudia Kraft and Kimberly Wachtler for their thorough edits and thoughtful
suggestions; and my parents, Keshi and Huiping Chen, as well as the rest of my family, for just
about everything else. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Much scholarly attention has been paid to the disturbing but increasingly
apparent notion that Medicaid is "metamorphosing into a right without a
remedy."' Because federal agency enforcement against the states for violations of
the Medicaid statute is impractical and therefore never utilized, enforcement of
the Medicaid statute has primarily been effectuated by private litigants through §
1983 suits.2 However, decisions made by Congress and the federal courts have
constrained the ability of private litigants to challenge states for violating the
Medicaid statute.3
Nowhere has this trend been more problematic than in the context of
Medicaid reimbursement rates. The extent to which Medicaid beneficiaries can
access health services depends crucially on the level of provider participation in
Medicaid.4  However, Medicaid reimbursement rates are the primary
determinants of provider participation levels.5 Thus, if states can cut
reimbursement rates in violation of the Medicaid statute with impunity, Medicaid
beneficiaries will suffer the harmful effects of impeded access to necessary
health services. Currently, the ability of Medicaid providers and beneficiaries to
challenge low Medicaid reimbursement levels through litigation is uncertain at
best, which spells trouble for the health outcomes of our poorest and most
vulnerable citizens and legal permanent residents.
This Note details how the current inability to challenge low Medicaid
payment rates came about; it then identifies and evaluates a potential solution to
this problem. Part I explains in more detail why private Medicaid enforcement is
vital to the health and well-being of Medicaid beneficiaries. Part II discusses the
ways in which prior litigants have challenged low reimbursement levels and
describes how these avenues have been foreclosed by Congress and the courts.
Part III provides an account of two new tactics that litigants have employed to
successfully challenge low Medicaid reimbursement rates. Finally, Part IV
evaluates the viability of one of those strategies: suing under the Reasonable
Promptness Provision of the Medicaid statute.
1. Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and
Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 413, 417 (2008); see, e.g., Rosemary B. Guiltinan,
Note, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: Preemption Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect
Medicaid Recipients'Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1583, 1600 (2010).
2. See infra Part 1.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See Sean Jessee, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal
Access Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY L.J. 791,796 (2009).
5. Id.
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I. MEDICAID AND SECTION 1983: THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE MEDICAID
ENFORCEMENT
Established in 1965 under Title XIX of the Social Security Act,6 Medicaid is
a medical assistance program that has become the largest source of health
insurance for low-income people.7 Medicaid currently provides services and
support to sixty-six million people, including thirty-two million children and
sixteen million elderly and disabled persons.8 The federal government and the
states fund Medicaid jointly; 9 the federal government "matches" state Medicaid
expenditures according to a formula based on a state's average personal income
relative to the national average.'0 States are not required to participate in
Medicaid, but states that choose to do so must structure and administer their
plans in compliance with the Medicaid statute and federal regulations." Among
other things, states must cover certain populations and services in their Medicaid
plans.'2 Beyond these requirements, states are allowed flexibility in choosing
additional benefits and populations to cover, as well as methods of delivery and
payment. 13
At the federal level, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS)
within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for
overseeing and administering Medicaid. 14 States must submit Medicaid plans to
CMS for approval, and if a state wants to implement policies that deviate from
federal Medicaid requirements, it must apply for a "waiver."' 5
CMS is also charged with monitoring and assuring state compliance with the
federal Medicaid requirements.'6 However, CMS's formal oversight has not been
an adequate means of ensuring that states actually comply with the requirements
6. For a discussion on Medicaid's history, see Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting
Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 5, 8-24
(2006).
7. Federal Core Requirements and State Options in Medicaid: Current Policies and Key
Issues, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (2011), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01 /
8174.pdf [hereinafter Federal Core Requirements].
8. Vernon Smith et al., Medicaid in a Historic Time of Transformation: Results from a 50-
State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 7
(2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/8498-medicaid-in-a-historic-
time-of-transformation.pdf.
9. Federal Core Requirements, supra note 7, at 1.
10. Smith et al., supra note 8, at 7.
11.42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2012).
13. Federal Core Requirements, upra note 7, at 1.
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set forth in the Medicaid statute and regulations, primarily because of the limited
range of enforcement mechanisms available to CMS and HHS. After CMS
approves a state's Medicaid plan, the only course of action that HHS can take if a
state does not comply with federal requirements is to withhold part or all of the
federal matching payment from that state. 17 This enforcement mechanism is
entirely impractical and counterproductive. States usually fail to comply with
federal Medicaid requirements by cutting reimbursement rates and services
because of budgetary shortfalls. Thus, withholding Medicaid funding from
noncompliant states would only work to exacerbate the problem that caused the
noncompliance by further diminishing the states' ability to provide Medicaid
services. This would ultimately make things worse for Medicaid beneficiaries,
who are the very group of people harmed by noncompliance in the first place. 18
Unsurprisingly, HHS has never used this mechanism to withhold federal
Medicaid funding from a noncompliant state.
The infeasibility and imprudence of HHS's sole means of enforcing state
compliance with Medicaid requirements highlights the importance of alternative
enforcement mechanisms. In particular, Medicaid beneficiaries and providers
have frequently resorted to federal litigation to compel states to comply with the
Medicaid statute and regulations,'9 especially under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20 In
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the Supreme Court held for the first time
that a provision of the Medicaid statute created a right that was enforceable under
§ 1983.21 Since Wilder, federal circuit courts have found various other provisions
of the Medicaid statute to confer rights to beneficiaries and providers that are
enforceable under § 1983.22 In the past decade, suits seeking to enforce Medicaid
provisions have been the most prevalent type of case brought under § 1983.23 In
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012); see also Mark A. Ison, Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right:
Medicaid, Section 1983, and the Cost of an Enforceable Right to Health Care, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1479, 1511 (2003) ("[T]he sole external enforcement mechanism is the termination or reduction of
federal payments to States failing to comply substantially with Medicaid provisions.").
18. See Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2003).
19. See Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12-13,
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. ofS. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, & 10-283).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 allows citizens to bring civil suits against state
officials for violations of federal rights. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that citizens could bring § 1983 lawsuits for violations of rights created by federal
statutes in addition to rights protected by the Constitution.
21. 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990).
22. E.g. Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the "reasonable
promptness" provision, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8), is enforceable under § 1983); S.D. ex rel Dickson
v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 607 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10) (2012), is
enforceable under § 1983).
23. See Devi M. Rao, Note, "Making Medical Assistance Available ": Enforcing the Medicaid
5
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the past twelve years alone, the Courts of Appeals have ruled on the
enforceability of twenty-three different Medicaid provisions under § 1983 in
forty-one different cases.24 The frequency with which Medicaid beneficiaries and
providers bring § 1983 suits against states underscores the crucial role that §
1983 litigation plays in ensuring that beneficiaries obtain the care and services
guaranteed to them by CMS-approved state plans and the federal Medicaid
requirements.
II. CHALLENGING Low MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT RATES: DAYS OF GLORY
PAST
In particular, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have relied on § 1983
litigation to protect themselves against the deleterious effects of state cutbacks on
Medicaid spending. Recent economic downturns have caused state tax revenues
to fall and Medicaid enrollments to surge.25 In response to this troublesome
combination of events, many states have implemented Medicaid spending
cutbacks, commonly in the form of reduced reimbursement rates to providers.
For example, in 2009, during the most recent recession, thirty-nine states reduced
or froze Medicaid reimbursement rates.26 Between 2001 and 2004, every state
reduced or froze reimbursement rates in response to the previous economic
recession.7 Considering the fact that Medicaid reimbursement rates have
historically been significantly lower than both Medicare and private insurance
rates,28 these rate reductions carry a substantial risk of harm to Medicaid
beneficiaries because the level of provider participation in Medicaid depends
crucially on reimbursement rates.29 The proportion of physicians who accept
Medicaid patients is greater in states with higher Medicaid reimbursement rates
Act's Availability Provision Through § 1983 Litigation, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1460 (2009).
24. JANE PERKINS & SARAH SOMERS, NAT'L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, ISSUE BRIEF: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEDICAID ACT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 6 (2013).
25. See Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Medicaid's Continuing Crunch In a
Recession: A Mid-Year Update for State FY 2010 and Preview for FY 2011, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
1, 5 (2010), http:/ www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8049.pdf.
26. Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Crunch Continues: Medicaid
Spending, Coverage and Policy in the Midst of a Recession, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 30 (2009), http://
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7985.pdf.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Headed for a Crunch: An Update on
Medicaid Spending, Coverage and Policy Heading into an Economic Downturn: Results from a 50-
State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 30
(2008), http:/ www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7815.pdf [hereinafter Headed for a Crunch].
29. Id. at 30.
15:2 (2015)
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relative to states with lower rates,3° and physicians cite low reimbursement rates
as the primary reason for not accepting Medicaid patients.31 When fewer
physicians and providers participate in Medicaid, the risk of impaired access to
care for Medicaid beneficiaries increases.
Many Medicaid beneficiaries and providers have brought § 1983 lawsuits to
challenge low reimbursement levels and rate reductions as violations of the
Medicaid statute.32 In the past, litigants primarily utilized two specific Medicaid
provisions in their attempts to force states to increase reimbursement rates: the
Boren Amendment and the Equal Access Provision.33 However, recent decisions
by Congress and the courts, respectively, have foreclosed both avenues of
recourse to plaintiffs seeking to challenge low reimbursement levels.
A. The Repeal of the Boren Amendment
The Boren Amendment provided, in relevant part, that:
[A] State plan for medical assistance must ... provide ... for payment .. of
the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate
care facility for the mentally retarded ... through the use of rates (determined
in accordance with the methods and standards developed by the State .. .)
which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently
and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in
conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and
safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance
have reasonable access (taking into account geographic location and reasonable
travel time) to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality .... 34
Enacted in 1980, the Boren Amendment was, "in its inception and
implementation, an effort to reduce federal and state expenditures.35 The Boren
30. Stephen Zuckerman et al., Changes in Medicaid Physician Fees, 1998-2003: Implications
for Physician Participation, HEALTH AFF. W4-381 (June 23, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.374vl.
31. Headed for a Crunch, supra note 28, at 30.
32. See Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the Obama
Administration is Undermining its own Health Reform Goals, 55 How. L.J. 771, 831 (2012).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (2012).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1994), amended by Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, § 4712(c), III Stat. 509.
35. Malcolm J. Harkins 11I, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Repeal of the Boren
Amendment and Continuing Federal Responsibility to Assure that State Medicaid Programs Pay
for Cost Effective Quality Nursing Facility Care, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159,174 (2001).
7
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Amendment made one procedural and one substantive change to the Medicaid
statute. Before 1980, the Secretary of HHS was responsible for determining
whether state Medicaid payment plans satisfied federal standards (the procedural
status quo), and state payment methods and standards were required to result in
reasonable cost-related payments (the substantive status quo).36 The Boren
Amendment shifted the responsibility of determining whether state payment
plans complied with federal standards to the states. The Amendment also shifted
the focus from payment methods to aggregate payment rates, requiring only that
payment rates be reasonable and adequate and doing away with the prior
requirement that they be cost-related.37
Even before the Supreme Court held that § 1983 conferred Medicaid
providers a private right of action to enforce the Boren Amendment,38 the federal
circuit courts were in almost unanimous agreement hat the Boren Amendment
was enforceable under § 1983.39 Most providers who sued states under the Boren
Amendment alleged both a procedural violation (that a state did not make a bona
fide finding that its plan would meet federal standards before implementing the
plan), and a substantive violation (that a state plan's reimbursement rates were
not reasonable and adequate).40 Though courts differed in their interpretations of
what states were required to do to make "findings" that their plans would meet
federal standards, once a court found that a state failed to make proper findings,
that state's payment methodology would almost certainly be invalidated without
further inquiry into whether the reimbursement rates were ultimately reasonable
and adequate.41 A state found to have satisfied the procedural requirement of the
Boren Amendment would enjoy relatively more deferential treatment in a court's
substantive inquiries.42 Providers had the burden of proving that reimbursement
rates fell outside a "zone of reasonableness,,43 which sometimes required a
showing that Medicaid payments did not cover the costs of a substantial
proportion of providers.
44
Medicaid providers utilized the Boren Amendment to pressure states to raise
their reimbursement rates45 with considerable success until 1997, when the
36. Id. at 169-70.
37. Id.
38. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990).
39. See Harkins, supra note 35, at 179.
40. Id. at 181.
41. Id. at 182-83.
42. Id. at 183.
43. See, e.g., Portland Residence, Inc. v. Steffen, 34 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1994).
44. See Harkins, supra note 35, at 184 n.123.
45. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-122, MEDICAID: SPENDING
PRESSURES DRIVE STATES TOWARD PROGRAM RETENTION, 53 (1995) ("Provider suits brought under
15:2 (2015)
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Amendment was repealed.46 States in general, and the National Governors
Association in particular, pushed for the repeal, claiming that the Boren
Amendment denied states fiscal and administrative discretion to control costs in
the face of rising health care costs, and that the Amendment prevented states
from exploiting market competition to secure lower prices for Medicaid
services. 47 The repeal's legislative history indicates that Congress specifically
intended to take away the ability of Medicaid providers to sue states under §
1983 because of low reimbursement levels.48 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997
repealed the Boren Amendment49 and replaced it with a requirement that states
use a public process to set reimbursement rates,50 thereby eliminating one
channel through which beneficiaries and providers could attempt to compel states
to raise Medicaid payment levels.
B. The Vitiation of the Equal Access Provision
In addition to the Boren Amendment, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries
also used the Equal Access Provision to bring § 1983 suits challenging low
Medicaid reimbursement levels. The Equal Access Provision requires state
Medicaid plans to ensure that payment rates are "sufficient to enlist enough
providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the
extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area.",51 The inclusion of this provision in the Medicaid statute
suggests that Congress was specifically trying to prevent states from cutting
reimbursement levels in the face of budgetary shortfalls.52 In the 1990s, federal
circuit courts generally allowed litigants to bring § 1983 suits to enforce the
Equal Access Provision,53 and even some providers successfully brought § 1983
the Boren Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13), have been a major factor pressuring states to
increase payment rates .... Particularly in recent years, states have been dogged by provider
lawsuits forcing them to better justify or raise their Medicaid payment rates to hospitals and nursing
homes.").
46. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4712(c), 11I Stat. 509; Guiltinan,
supra note 1, at 1598.
47. See Harkins, supra note 35, at 189.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 105-149, at 591 (1997) ("It is the Committee's intention that, following
enactment of this Act, neither this nor any other provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1396a] will be
interpreted as establishing a cause of action for hospitals and nursing facilities relative to the
adequacy of the rates they receive.").
49. Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4712(c), III Stat. 509 (1997).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (2012).
51.42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (2012).
52. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the
"Equal Access" Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 674 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1005 (1st Cir.
9
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claims arguing that state officials violated the Equal Access Provision by setting
Medicaid reimbursement rates too low. 5 4 Unfortunately, this mechanism for
keeping states honest with regards to Medicaid payment levels has also been
neutralized, primarily by two cases that are part of the Supreme Court's recent §
1983 jurisprudence.
In the 1997 case Blessing v. Freestone, the Court held that Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act, which details the eligibility requirements for child support
services, does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to
comply with its provisions.55 In reaching this holding, the Court delineated a
three-part test for determining whether a federal statute creates a private right that
is enforceable under § 1983: "First, Congress must have intended that the
provision in question benefit the plaintiff'; second, the potential federal right
must not be so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain the
courts; and third, "the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation
on the States.56
The Court elaborated upon this three-part test just five years later in
Gonzaga University v. Doe.57 In deciding that the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) did not confer a federal right enforceable under § 1983,58
the Court attempted to clarify the first prong of the three-part test it established in
Blessing. The Gonzaga Court stressed that only rights, and not vague "benefits"
or "interests," are enforceable through § 1983, and thus in order to satisfy the
first prong of the test a statute must "unambiguously" confer a right.59 The Court
applied a textual analysis for determining whether a statute confers a right,
emphasizing that the statute must contain "rights-creating" language that is
"phrased in terns of the person benefited' 60 as opposed to language with "an
aggregate, not individual, focus."'61 By setting forth a more limited set of criteria
for determining the existence of statutory rights, the Court narrowed the range of
statutes that confer privately enforceable rights, thereby diminishing the
availability of § 1983 as a means of suing state officials for violations of federal
1996); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 1996); Ark. Med. Soc'y,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1993).
54. See Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 531 (holding that a rate reduction by Arkansas's Medicaid plan
violated the Equal Access Provision). But see Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1029-30 (holding that plaintiffs
did not show that Indiana's Medicaid reimbursement rates violated the Equal Access Provision).
55. 520 U.S. 329, 332 (1997).
56. Id. at 340-41.
57. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
58. Id. at 276.
59. Id. at 282-83.
60. id. at 284.
6 I. Id. at 290.
15:2 (2015)
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statutes.
The federal circuit courts have applied Blessing and Gonzaga to render the
Equal Access Provision unenforceable. Every circuit court but one that has
considered the enforceability of the Equal Access Provision under § 1983 after
Gonzaga has found it unenforceable by Medicaid providers,62 and most of them
have also found it unenforceable by beneficiaries.63 The circuit courts have
variously held that the Equal Access Provision was not intended to benefit
Medicaid providers,64 that it lacks "rights creating language, 65 and that it has an
"aggregate and systemic" rather than an "individualized" focus. 66 In short, the
Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence has precluded enforcement of the Equal
Access Provision against the states under § 1983.
Several plaintiffs have attempted to work around the § 1983 barrier by
bringing federal preemption claims, alleging that state laws that conflict with the
Medicaid statute violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.67 Some circuit courts have employed the Supremacy Clause to
invalidate state laws for conflicting with the Medicaid statute,68 and the Supreme
Court recently assumed without explicitly stating that Medicaid beneficiaries had
an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce an anti-lien
provision of the Medicaid statute.69 It looked like the Court would have the
chance to decide whether the Equal Access Provision in particular could be
enforced through the Supremacy Clause in Douglas v. Independent Living Center
of Southern California, Inc., 70 but because of a change in circumstances,7' the
62. Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007); Mandy R. ex rel. Mr.
and Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d
532 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharm.
Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50 (1 st Cir. 2004); Pa. Pharm. Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531 (3d
Cir. 2002). But see Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005
(8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Equal Access Provision is enforceable under § 1983), vacated sub
noma. Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142 (2007).
63. Equal Access for El Paso, 509 F.3d at 697; Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. R., 464 F.3d at
1139; Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 532; Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1051. But see Pa. Pharm. Ass'n,
283 F.3d at 544 (stating in dicta that Medicaid beneficiaries are "potential private plaintiffs").
64. See, e.g., Pa Pharm. Ass 'n, 283 F.3d at 540.
65. See, e.g., Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance, 362 F.3d at 57.
66. See, e.g., Equal Access for El Paso, 509 F.3d at 704.
67. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; see Rochelle Bobroff, Medicaid Preemption Remedy Survives
Supreme Court Challenge, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 35, 35 (2012) ("As access to federal courts
narrows, Medicaid beneficiaries increasingly rely on preemption claims as the basis for litigation to
challenge state laws that conflict with the Medicaid statute.").
68. See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood of Houston &
Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2005).
69. Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013).
70. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
11
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Court avoided the issue by vacating and remanding to the Ninth Circuit.72
However, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for four dissenters, insisted that the
plaintiffs-a group of Medicaid providers-did not have a cause of action under
the Supremacy Clause to enforce the Equal Access Provision against California.
The Chief Justice reasoned that, because the Medicaid statute gives CMS-and
only CMS-the responsibility to enforce the requirements of the statute against
the states, allowing providers to sue under the Supremacy Clause would conflict
with congressional intent to vest sole enforcement authority in CMS.73
The Chief Justice's reasoning in Douglas foreshadowed the ultimate demise
of the Equal Access Provision as a means of challenging state Medicaid cutbacks
through private rights of action. In Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. ,7
a divided Court held that providers of residential habilitation services to
Medicaid enrollees did not have a private cause of action through the Equal
Access Provision to enjoin Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare from
setting Medicaid reimbursement rates at improperly low levels.75 Specifically,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that the Supremacy Clause
76itself does not contain a private right of action, and that although litigants can
generally obtain private rights of action through the equitable power of courts to
enjoin unconstitutional actions by state or federal officers, the Medicaid statute
implicitly precludes equitable relief in the case of the Equal Access Provision.
77
Justice Scalia proffered two factors that "establish Congress's 'intent to
foreclose' equitable relief' 71 in the Equal Access Provision context. First, he
cited the fact that the "sole remedy Congress provided for a State's failure to
comply with Medicaid's requirements" is the withholding of Medicaid funding
by HHS.79 Second, he emphasized the "judicially unadministrable nature" of the
Equal Access Provision's text, asserting that it would be difficult to imagine a
"broader and less specific" requirement.80 These two features combined
constituted sufficient evidence, in the majority's eyes, that Congress "wanted to
make the agency remedy that it provided exclusive," thereby thwarting the
71. CMS initially disapproved of California's State Plan Amendments (SPAs), through which
California wished to implement cuts to its Medicaid reimbursement rates. However, after California
withdrew some of the cuts, CMS approved the remaining cuts about one month after oral
arguments. Id. at 1209.
72. Id. at 1208.
73. Id. at 1211-12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
74. 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).
75. Id. at 1388.
76. Id. at 1384.
77. Id. at 1385.
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courts' equitable power to allow private enforcement of the Equal Access
Provision.81 In short, it seems that the Court, through its decision in Armstrong,
has all but eliminated any possibility for private litigants to utilize the Equal
Access Provision to challenge state cutbacks on Medicaid reimbursement rates.
III. A NEW HOPE? Two POTENTIAL WORKAROUNDS
With the Boren Amendment repealed and the private enforceability of the
Equal Access Provision eviscerated by the Court, what other possible means do
Medicaid beneficiaries or providers have to protect themselves against harmful
cuts to reimbursement rates? For starters, there is a specific provision within the
Medicaid statute that addresses payment methodology and reimbursement rates
for services provided by federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) and rural
health clinics (RHCs),82 and some of these providers have utilized this provision
to compel states to raise reimbursement rates under § 1983. Additionally, one
consumer health advocacy group was able to force a state to raise its payment
rates on behalf of a set of Medicaid beneficiaries using the Reasonable
Promptness Provision,3 another requirement in the Medicaid statute. This tactic
has only been attempted once in a federal court,84 but it may be worthwhile to
consider it as a potential alternative mechanism for suing states for higher
payment levels. Thus, the bulk of the remainder of this Note will examine the
Reasonable Promptness Provision as a tool for challenging state cutbacks on
Medicaid reimbursement rates.
A. Section 1396a (a) (bb): Relieffor FQHCs and RHCs
Section 1396a(a)(bb) sets forth the methodology that states must use to
calculate payments levels to FQHCs and RHCs.85 The provisions under this
section were introduced by the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA),86 and they allow for two
primary methods of reimbursement. The first is a "prospective payment system"
under which states must calculate reimbursement rates based on the previous
year's average costs, augmented by the percentage increase in the Medicare
81. Id. (quoting Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292 (2002)).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(bb) (2012).
83.42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2012).
84. Health Care for All v. Romney (Health Care for All If), No. Civ.A. 00-10833-RWZ, 2005
WL 1660677 (D. Mass. July 14, 2005).
85.42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(bb) (2012).
86. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § l(a)(6), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
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Economic Index and adjusted for any change in the scope of services offered by a
particular clinic. 87 The second is an "alternative payment system" that allows
states more flexibility, as long as the state and the clinic agree on the system and
the resulting rates are at least equal to those under the prospective payment
system.88
Lower federal courts have held that § 1396a(a)(bb) confers statutory rights
that are enforceable under § 1983.89 In particular, courts have allowed FQHCs
and RICs to bring § 1983suits challenging reimbursement rates as lower than
required by § 1396a(bb).90 Section 1396a(bb) is very specific with regards to the
methodology by which payments to FQHCs and RHCs must be calculated,
rendering deviations from the required rates very clear and easy to prove.
Therefore, suing states under § 1983 for violating § 1396a(bb) of the Medicaid
statute seems to be an effective mechanism through which FQHCs and RHCs can
ensure receipt of the federally required levels of payment for the services that
they provide.
B. The Reasonable Promptness Provision
In Health Care for All v. Romney,9' a consumer health advocacy
organization brought a § 1983 lawsuit against Massachusetts officials on behalf
of a group of Medicaid beneficiaries for an alleged violation of the Reasonable
Promptness Provision. This provision requires state plans to "provide that all
individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan
shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals."92 The plaintiffs successfully
convinced the District Court for the District of Massachusetts that by providing
insufficient reimbursement to Medicaid dental care providers, Massachusetts
violated the Reasonable Promptness Provision. The court found the low payment
levels to be one of the primary causes for the unreasonable delays that juvenile
Medicaid beneficiaries experienced in accessing dental services.
93
The plaintiffs originally sued under both the Reasonable Promptness
87.42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(bb)(2)-(3) (2012).
88.42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(bb)(6) (2012).
89. See, e.g., N.J. Primary Care Ass'n. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 722 F.3d 527 (3d Cir.
2013); Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005).
90. See, e.g., Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007); Cmty.
Health Care Ass'n of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Heath, 921 F.Supp.2d 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
91. Health Care for All v. Romney, No. Civ.A. 00-10833-RWZ, 2005 WL 1660677 (D. Mass.
July 14, 2005).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2012).
93. Health Care for All II, 2005 WL 1660677 at * 15.
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Provision and the Equal Access Provision, but a previous decision handed down
by the same court held that Health Care for All did not have a private cause of
action to enforce the Equal Access Provision under § 1983.94 In the subsequent
decision, the court then found that the juvenile Medicaid beneficiaries
experienced "extraordinary difficulty in obtaining timely dental services" at two
stages.95 First, the beneficiaries struggled to find dental care providers who
accepted MassHealth (the Massachusetts Medicaid program) patients, in part
because the MassHealth provider lists were not updated frequently enough to
accurately reflect the fact that more and more dental care providers were refusing
to accept MassHealth patients.96 In their complaint, the beneficiaries alleged that
after their usual providers stopped accepting MassHealth patients, they spent
many hours calling providers on the list, cold-calling other private providers, and
seeking word-of-mouth referrals.97 Many of the beneficiaries could not locate
any available providers; as a result, these beneficiaries either went without
treatment or paid out-of-pocket for services that should have been covered by
MassHealth.98 Furthermore, those beneficiaries who were fortunate enough to
locate dental providers who still accepted MassHealth patients faced substantial
waiting periods. The court found that beneficiaries with non-emergency
conditions had to wait anywhere between two months and a year for an actual
appointment after locating a participating provider.99
The Health Care for All court held that these significant obstacles and delays
constituted a violation of the Reasonable Promptness Provision. 00 Additionally,
the court asserted that "the difficulties encountered by enrollees who sought
dental appointments resulted from a shortage of dentists participating in
MassHealth."'0' The plaintiffs were able to convince the court that the shortage
of participating dentists was caused by low reimbursement rates,102 leading the
court to hold that the low reimbursement rates themselves constituted a violation
of the Reasonable Promptness Provision. 103 The court then ordered the parties to
94. Health Care for All v. Romney (Health Care for All I), No. Civ.A. 00-10833-RWZ, 2004
WL 3088654, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2004).
95. Health CareforAll 11, 2005 WL 1660677 at *10.
96. See Third Amended Complaint at 12-20, Health Care for All v. Romney, No. Civ.A. 00-
10833-RWZ, 2004 WL 5468533 (D. Mass. July 14,2005).
97. Id. at 12-20; see Health Care for All II, 2005 WL 1660677 at * 10.
98. Health Care for Al 11, 2005 WL 1660677 at *10.
99. Id. at *10.
100. Id. at *15.
101. Id. at *11.
102. Id. ("[P]laintiffs' evidence persuasively demonstrates that MassHealth established
reimbursement levels so low that private dentists could not afford to treat enrollees who, thus,
either received dental care only after much delay or not at all.").
103. Id. at *15 ("Plaintiffs have demonstrated that defendants violated sections of the
15
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attempt to develop a joint remedial program, which resulted in an agreement hat
required Massachusetts to increase dental payment levels for services furnished
to beneficiaries under twenty-one by at least $13.74 million. The program also
required Massachusetts to pay dental care providers for certain procedures for
which MassHealth had not previously provided reimbursements-such as root
canals on second molars. 104
IV. EVALUATING THE REASONABLE PROMPTNESS PROVISION AS A MEANS OF
CHALLENGING Low REIMBURSEMENT RATES
The success of the Health Care for All plaintiffs suggests that suing states
under the Reasonable Promptness Provision may be a viable option for similarly-
situated beneficiaries seeking to challenge low Medicaid reimbursement rates.
One appealing feature of the Reasonable Promptness Provision is that it has been
held to be enforceable under § 1983 by all federal circuit courts that have
considered its enforceability,'0 5 indicating that its text is sufficient to overcome
the Blessing and Gonzaga hurdles. However, the fact that the Reasonable
Promptness Provision has only been utilized once to challenge low Medicaid
reimbursement levels in the federal courts suggests some reluctance on the part
of plaintiffs to use the Reasonable Promptness Provision for this purpose.
Plaintiffs may be reluctant for various reasons; there may be other barriers to
deploying the Reasonable Promptness Provision, or perhaps' certain uncommon
or extreme conditions must exist for courts to find a violation of the provision.
Below, I discuss four factors that may affect the feasibility of utilizing the
Reasonable Promptness Provision to compel reimbursement rate increases.
A. The Reasonable Promptness Provision Is Only Enforceable by Medicaid
Beneficiaries
One characteristic of the Reasonable Promptness Provision that might
explain why it has not been used frequently to challenge low payment levels is
that it only seems to confer statutory rights to Medicaid beneficiaries, and not
Medicaid Act that require prompt provision of services . .. and that these violations resulted, in
part, from insufficient reimbursement.").
104. First Joint Report on Proposed Remedial Program at 3-7, Health Care for All v. Romney,
No. Civ.A. 00-10833-RWZ, 2005 WL 5913277 (D. Mass. July 14, 2005).
105. Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348 (4th Cir.
2007); Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004); Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir.
2002); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11 th Cir. 1999); see also Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d 452
(7th Cir. 2007) (assuming that the Reasonable Promptness provision confers statutory rights
enforceable under § 1983 without explicitly deciding the issue).
15:2 (2015)
16
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 15 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol15/iss2/3
IN THE NICK OF TIME
providers. To satisfy the first prong of the Blessing three-part test, the provision
that confers the asserted statutory right must "benefit the plaintiff."'10 6 The
Reasonable Promptness Provision requires states to provide medical assistance
that "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals."' 07
It is clear from this text that the provision confers a right to Medicaid
beneficiaries only; it does not directly benefit Medicaid providers. The federal
courts that have considered this issue have held that Medicaid providers cannot
enforce the Reasonable Promptness Provision under § 1983.108
If the goal is to challenge low reimbursement rates, it might be problematic
if only Medicaid beneficiaries can bring § 1983 suits to enforce the Reasonable
Promptness provision. Compared to health care providers, Medicaid beneficiaries
are generally much less able, and therefore much less likely, to initiate lawsuits
because they have relatively fewer resources. Additionally, Medicaid
beneficiaries are less likely to be able to overcome the collective action problem;
the "costs" of low Medicaid provider payment levels to beneficiaries (in the form
of reduced access to medical services) are diffuse, so for any individual
beneficiary, the cost of litigating likely outweighs the uncertain benefit of
increased access to medical services. Furthermore, because a successful suit to
compel increased reimbursement rates would benefit all Medicaid beneficiaries,
there is also a free-rider problem. Each individual beneficiary is better off letting
some other beneficiary incur the costs of litigation because, if the suit is
successful, all beneficiaries who did not partake in the litigation can reap the
same benefits stemming from the suit's outcome without having incurred any
litigation costs. This makes it even more unlikely that any one beneficiary will
initiate a lawsuit. These obstacles highlight the importance of consumer health
advocacy groups and other organizations like Health Care for All that advocate
on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries. These organizations make up for the
beneficiaries' lack of monetary resources, and they also help overcome the
collective action problem by bringing beneficiaries together and lowering the
litigation costs to each individual beneficiary.
On the other hand, all of the problems discussed above apply to § 1983 suits
that attempt to enforce other Medicaid provisions that only confer rights to
beneficiaries, as well as to Reasonable Promptness suits that are not aimed at
challenging low reimbursement rates. Yet, neither of these types of suits has been
106. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2012).
108. See, e.g., Women's Hosp. Found. v. Townsend, No. 07-711-JJB-DLD, 2008 WL
2743284, at *10 (M.D. La. July 10, 2008); Bio-Med. Applications of NC, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 412 F.Supp.2d 549, 554 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
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in short supply in the federal courts.10 9 For example, the Minimum Services
Provision, which requires states to provide certain categories and types of
"medical assistance" to Medicaid beneficiaries, has been utilized by many
plaintiff beneficiaries in many federal § 1983 lawsuits to sue states for neglecting
to provide required services.' This disparity suggests that the infrequency with
which Reasonable Promptness suits are brought to challenge low reimbursement
levels is not due solely to the fact that only beneficiaries can enforce the
Reasonable Promptness Provision.
B. It is Difficult for Plaintiffs to Prove that Low Medicaid Reimbursement Rates
Themselves Violate the Reasonable Promptness Provisions
Perhaps the potential difficulty in using the Reasonable Promptness
Provision to challenge low payment levels lies not in the fact that only
beneficiaries can enforce the Reasonable Promptness Provision, but rather in the
difficulties that beneficiaries might face in proving that low reimbursement rates
are the proximate cause of unreasonable delays in accessing Medicaid services. It
might be the case that health providers, who certainly have more knowledge than
beneficiaries (and perhaps consumer health advocacy groups) about the health
care delivery system, would be better equipped to prove that low reimbursement
rates cause more providers to refuse Medicaid patients, thereby creating barriers
to accessing Medicaid services. If this is true, beneficiary plaintiffs seeking to
challenge low reimbursement rates under the Reasonable Promptness Provision
would probably benefit from finding ways to incorporate provider knowledge
and expertise into their litigation efforts.
This is exactly what the Health Care for All plaintiffs did as part of their
successful efforts to prove that low dental reimbursement rates caused the
unreasonably prompt provision of juvenile dental services. First, the plaintiffs
cited a 2000 Report of the Special Legislative Commission on Oral Health,
1 2
which was commissioned by the Massachusetts legislature, to support the
propositions that low dental provider participation in MassHealth impeded access
to dental health services and that low MassHealth reimbursement rates for dental
109. See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 445-46 (discussing how the circuit courts have handled §
1983 suits under the Minimum Services and Reasonable Promptness provisions).
110. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10) (2012).
111. See, e.g., Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2006); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood,
391 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2004).
112. The Oral Health Crisis of Massachusetts: Report of the Special Legislative Commission
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services were the primary cause of the low participation rate.11 3 Specifically, they
cited the Commission's finding that only fourteen percent of the 4,500 dentists in
Massachusetts accepted MassHealth, and that this proportion was likely going to
shrink even further as more dentists left MassHealth due to low payment
levels."14 They also cited the Commission's finding, regarding the shortage of
MassHealth dentists, that "[o]ne of the most significant factors is the
longstanding inadequacy of the MassHealth fee schedule. Present reimbursement
rates are so dramatically below current market levels that dentists who choose to
treat MassHealth patients receive fees that cover only about 75% of their direct
costs of providing the service.
' 15
The plaintiffs offered testimony from several dental providers to substantiate
their claim that low reimbursement rates created barriers to access for
beneficiaries. One provider, a former Dentist-in-Chief of the Children's Hospital
Dental Clinic (CHDC), explained that CHDC operated at a loss because of low
MassHealth payment levels. " 6 Another provider testified that he and the vast
majority of other providers with private practices refuse to accept MassHealth
patients because doing so would force them to operate at a loss.117 The plaintiffs'
strategy worked beautifully; the court commented that the "plaintiffs' evidence
persuasively demonstrates that MassHealth established reimbursement levels so
low that private dentists could not afford to treat enrollees who, thus, either
received dental care only after much delay or not at all." ' 18 The court then held
that these low reimbursement levels constituted a violation of the Reasonable
Promptness Provision. 19
The strategies employed by the Health Care for All plaintiffs suggest a role
for providers to play in challenging low payment rates as violations of the
Reasonable Promptness Provision. Though they cannot personally bring § 1983
suits under the Provision, providers can assist beneficiaries by testifying about
the effects of low rates on provider participation in Medicaid. Doing so would
actually be in their interest, as both providers and beneficiaries would benefit
from higher Medicaid reimbursement levels. However, while the Health Care for
All strategy was successful, it may be quite expensive to replicate; securing
extensive provider testimony may be time and resource intensive. Furthermore,
Health Care for All leaves uncertain the amount of evidence that is sufficient to
113. Health Care for All v. Romney, No. Civ.A. 00-10833-RWZ, 2005 WL 1660677, at *3 (D.
Mass. July 14, 2005).
114. Id.
115. Health Care for All 11, 2005 WL 1660677, at *4.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id. at *11.
119. Id.
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prove causation. It is unclear whether future plaintiffs could rely solely on the
testimony of providers, or whether citation to some sort of report or study is
necessary. If the latter were the case, and if in a given litigation context there
were no pre-existing studies to which the plaintiffs could refer, then the high
burden of proof might render the Reasonable Promptness Provision infeasible as
a means of challenging low reimbursement levels.
Finally, it is important to note that in order to prompt a state to raise
reimbursement rates, plaintiffs do not necessarily have to prove that the state is
violating the Reasonable Promptness Provision specifically by setting
reimbursement rates too low. That is, as long as a plaintiff proves a Reasonable
Promptness violation on the part of a state, there is some chance that the state
will raise its payment levels to Medicaid providers in response. For example, if a
state is ordered to remedy a Reasonable Promptness violation by decreasing wait
times, the state might choose to comply with this order by raising reimbursement
rates so that more providers are willing to serve Medicaid beneficiaries.
However, when compared to piecemeal litigation involving scattered plaintiffs
challenging long wait times for vastly different Medicaid services, a successful
direct challenge increases the likelihood of system-wide changes in
reimbursement rates.
C. The Definition of "Medical Assistance" in the Medicaid Statute
One relatively recent trend in some circuits regarding the interpretation of
the term "medical assistance" in the Medicaid statute might have foreclosed
some Reasonable Promptness suits in those circuits and caused reluctance to sue
under the Reasonable Promptness Provision in others. The Reasonable
Promptness Provision obliges states to provide "medical assistance" with
"reasonable promptness."120 In Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich,121
Judge Richard Posner understood "medical assistance" as referring to 'financial
assistance rather than ... actual medical services." In other words, Judge Posner
reasoned that the Reasonable Promptness Provision only requires states to
provide "funds to eligible individuals," rather than actual medical services,
promptly.122 In Judge Posner's view, because Medicaid is "a payment scheme,
not a scheme for state-provided medical assistance," requiring states to provide
prompt treatment would constitute an inappropriate "direct regulation of medical
services."'' 23 However, this assertion was mere dicta. Judge Posner used other
120.42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2012).





Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 15 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol15/iss2/3
IN THE NICK OF TIME
reasoning to hold that Illinois's Medicaid plan was not in violation of the
Reasonable Promptness Provision, and the discussion regarding the definition of
"medical assistance" was only used to bolster his position. Specifically, Judge
Posner stated that "even if' his previous reasoning was not valid, the plaintiffs'
theory of the case would be "a considerable stretch" because of his view of the
definition of "medical assistance."'
' 24
The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits followed suit by holding that "medical
assistance" refers only to financial assistance for medical services, and not to the
medical services themselves.125 Some district courts in other circuits also
followed this trend. 26 Though many of these decisions cited Bruggeman, all of
them relied primarily on the definition of "medical assistance" provided in the
definitions section of the Medicaid statute, which states that "medical assistance
means payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and services," 27 to
reach their holdings.
This definition of "medical assistance" is fatal to almost all Reasonable
Promptness suits. Under this interpretation, both the level of reimbursement to
Medicaid providers and the promptness with which beneficiaries receive care are
wholly irrelevant; so long as a state ensures that some amount of
reimbursement--even an amount below the cost of providing care-reaches
providers promptly, that state will have satisfied the Reasonable Promptness
requirement. Indeed, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts
recognized the unsavory consequences of such an interpretation of "medical
assistance" in Health Care for All v. Romney. In response to the state's argument
that "medical assistance" should be read to mean only payment for medical
services, the court called the state's reading "myopic," asserting that "[t]imely
payment for services does little to benefit enrollees who cannot find a provider
willing to accept such payment. Because payment for services necessarily
presumes delivery of services, state Medicaid programs may indirectly impede




125. Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 562 F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 2009); Mandy R. ex
rel. Mr. and Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski,
454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006).
126. See, e.g., Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, Civil No. 05-4723 (AET), 2010 WL
3862536 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2010); Doe v. Kidd, Civil Action No. 3:03-1918-MBS, 2010 WL
419922 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2010).
127.42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006).
128. Health Care for All v. Romney, No. Civ.A. 00-10833-RWZ, 2005 WL 1660677, at *9 (D.
Mass. July 14, 2005).
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Fortunately, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)'29 seems
to have addressed this problem by amending the definitions section of the
Medicaid statute. The section now defines "medical assistance" as "payment of
part or all of the cost of the following care and services or the care and services
themselves, or both."'"3 Additionally, a House Committee Report accompanying
the amendment emphasized that (1) the longstanding definition of "medical
assistance" has always been both payment for services and the services
themselves; (2) that recent court opinions construing "medical assistance" to
mean only payment for services run contrary to longstanding practice and render
some sections of Title XIX absurd; and (3) that the purpose of the amendment
was to "correct any misunderstandings as to the meaning of the term" and to
"conform this definition to the longstanding administrative use and
understanding of the term."' 31
Because the courts that construed "medical assistance" to mean mere
payment relied primarily on the text of the definitions section of the Medicaid
statute, the amendment should give plaintiffs the ability to convince those courts
to overrule their erroneous constructions. In fact, one set of plaintiffs succeeded
in getting a district court to change its erroneous construction after filing for
reconsideration and arguing that "an intervening change in controlling law" (the
amendment of the definitions section) required the court to adjust its previous
interpretation of "medical assistance."'32 Additionally, all post-ACA federal
court decisions that construed "medical assistance" to mean no more than
payment did not take the amended definitions section into account.33 Thus, it
seems likely that the ACA's amendment to the definitions section of the
Medicaid statute has revived and reinforced the viability of the Reasonable
Promptness Provision as a means of challenging low Medicaid reimbursement
levels.
D. What is Reasonably Prompt?
Finally, plaintiffs might be deterred from using the Reasonable Promptness
Provision to sue states for unreasonably low payment rates by the criteria that
courts use to determine what constitutes "reasonable promptness." Perhaps a
court would only find a violation of the Reasonable Promptness Provision when
129. Pub. L. No. 111-148,124 Stat. 119(2010).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
131. H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 1, at 649-50 (2009).
132. Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, Civil No. 05-4723 (AET), 2010 WL 5055820, at *2
(D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2010).
133. E.g. Phoenix Memorial Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010); Covenant
Health Sys. v. Sebelius, 820 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9 (D.D.C. 2011).
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delays in the delivery of services are extreme. Reluctance to bring § 1983 suits
under the provision may also stem from uncertainty as to what kinds of criteria
courts will utilize to decide whether services have been provided with reasonable
promptness. An examination of the regulations and case law related to the
Reasonable Promptness Provision suggests that the second explanation is not
unreasonable.
One would think that a provision as vague and open-textured as the
Reasonable Promptness Provision would be accompanied by regulations issued
to clarify what constitutes "reasonable promptness," but it turns out that there are
less than a handful of regulations related to the Provision, and only one of them
provides significant guidance for litigants, courts, and states.34 Among other
requirements, 42 C.F.R. § 435.912 sets forth timeliness standards for states for
determining Medicaid eligibility: it forbids states from taking longer than forty-
five and ninety days to determine the eligibility of non-disabled applicants and
disabled applicants, respectively, and it also forbids states from using time
standards as "a waiting period before determining eligibility."' 3 5 42 C.F.R. §
435.930 requires states to "[f]urnish Medicaid promptly to beneficiaries without
any delay caused by the agency's administrative procedures" and to continue
furnishing Medicaid to "all eligible individuals until they are found to be
ineligible." 136 Finally, 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(e) requires state agencies responsible
for administering Medicaid to set timeliness standards for the provision of Early
Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) services that meet
"reasonable standards of medical and dental practice."'137 State agencies must
consult with "recognized medical and dental organizations involved in child
health care" before setting these standards, and must ensure timely initiation of
treatment that generally does not exceed six months after a request for screening
services. 138 The dearth of regulations clarifying the meaning of "reasonable
promptness" might be explained by the fact that what constitutes reasonably
prompt provision of care is completely dependent on what condition the care is
supposed to be treating. Because illnesses and conditions vary so widely, any set
of regulations aimed at defining "reasonable promptness" would have to provide
a different standard for at least every category of illness or condition.
Presumably, 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(e) provides some guidance for plaintiffs
attempting to sue states for unreasonable delays in the provision of EPSDT
services. If a state fails to establish timeliness standards, consult with medical
134.42 C.F.R. § 441.56(e) (2013).
135.42 C.F.R. § 435.912 (2013).
136.42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (2013).
137. 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(e) (2013).
138. Id.
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and dental professionals before establishing those standards, or provide initial
treatment within six months of a request, then it clearly violates the regulation.
However, the fact that the plaintiffs in Health Care for All did not invoke 42
C.F.R. § 441.56(e) is puzzling. This suggests some sort of confusion about the
regulation's role in defining "reasonable promptness" in the context of EPSDT
services. Those plaintiffs brought suit because juvenile Medicaid beneficiaries
faced enormous delays in receiving dental services, which fall under the EPSDT
umbrella. Yet, they did not argue that Massachusetts was in violation of 42
C.F.R. § 441.56(e). It could be the case that Massachusetts did in fact set
timeliness standards after consulting with the appropriate professionals, and that
the plaintiffs were trying to prove that Massachusetts was violating the
Reasonable Promptness Provision despite satisfying the requirements of 42
C.F.R. § 441.56(e), but none of this is explicitly discussed or addressed by either
party or the court.
Adding to this confusion, at least one federal district court has applied the 42
C.F.R. § 441.56(e) requirements to the provision of non-EPSDT services. In that
case,139 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania acknowledged
that the regulation only specifically implements EPSDT services. It does not
cover behavioral health rehabilitative (BHR) services, which were the services at
issue. But the court then decided that "in the absence of another guide by which
to base timeliness, the Court may compare the Defendant's provision of services
against this standard," and found the state to be in violation of the Reasonable
Promptness Provision because it did not establish timeliness standards for BHR
services after adequate consultation with medical providers. 1
40
Another federal district court made a similarly odd move by applying the
ninety-day limit on eligibility determinations for disabled Medicaid applicants
found in 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 to the actual provision of care to disabled Medicaid
recipients. In Boulet v. Celluci, the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts explicitly stated that "[w]hile this regulation is focused on
eligibility determinations rather than the actual provision of services, it still gives
some guidance to courts attempting to decide what time periods may be
considered reasonably prompt in the larger context."'14 1 The court went on to find
that Massachusetts violated the Reasonable Promptness Provision by subjecting
Medicaid enrollees to unreasonably long waiting periods, and ordered the state to
provide the services to each beneficiary no later than ninety days after the
beneficiary was placed on the waiting list.142 However, in a later decision, the
139. Kirk T. v. Houstoun, No. 99-3253, 2000 WL 830731 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2000).
140. Id. at *2-3.
141. 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2000).
142. Id. at 80.
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District Court for the Eastern District of New York declined to follow Boulet's
application of the regulation's ninety-day limit, asserting that applying this limit
would be "completely arbitrary because the record contains no information
suggesting that the magic number ninety bears any relation to what is reasonable
in this case."'
143
The Reasonable Promptness case law that does not involve federal rules and
regulations is just as haphazard and, ultimately, unilluminating. Some early court
decisions held that any delay in the provision of services, or any use of waiting
lists, constituted a violation of the Reasonable Promptness Provision.144 In the
case that is most often cited for this proposition, Sobky v. Smoley,145 the District
Court for the Eastern District of California applied the borrowed statute doctrine
to reach this conclusion. The court first observed that the Reasonable Promptness
Provision was borrowed from a similar provision with almost the exact same
wording in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) portion of the
Social Security Act. 146 The court then pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in
Jefferson v. Hackney, which construed the borrowed provision in the AFDC
program to forbid waiting lists. The Supreme Court relied on legislative history
to hold that "the statute was intended to prevent the States from denying benefits,
even temporarily, to a person who has been found fully qualified for aid."'
147
Finally, the Sobky court reasoned from this chain of events that the Reasonable
Promptness Provision in the Medicaid statute must also prohibit states from
implementing any waiting lists or delays. 1 48 More recent court decisions have
also held that waiting periods of several years or longer are obvious violations of
the Reasonable Promptness Provision. 149
Recently, courts seem to be more reluctant to construe the Reasonable
Promptness Provision as prohibiting all delays or waiting lists. Few of the recent
cases even cite Sobky, let alone use its reasoning. Perhaps courts or litigants have
come to think that the Medicaid program is so different from the AFDC program
143. Alexander A. ex rel. Barr v. Novello, Civ.A. No. 99-CV-8418, 210 F.R.D. 27, 38
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002).
144. See, e.g., Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 79; Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1149 (E.D.
Cal. 1994). In Boulet, the court concedes that "the state must only provide services in facilities if
those facilities are available." Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
145. 855 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
146.42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(l0)(A) (1994).
147. Sobky, 855 F. Supp. at 1148 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972)).
148. Sobky, 855 F. Supp. at 1148.
149. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("It is axiomatic that delays of several
years ... are far outside the realm of reasonableness."); Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 80
(D. Mass. 2000) ("Here, where some of the delays extend more than a decade, I have little trouble
finding that the defendants have not been reasonably prompt if facilities are available for offering
the requested services.").
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that their respective "reasonable promptness" provisions are not in pari materia.
One district court made this point explicitly; in refusing to apply the borrowed
statute doctrine to construe the Reasonable Promptness Provision to prohibit any
delay, the court observed that "[a]lthough distribution of welfare money, which
was an issue in Jefferson, can be expected to occur without delays, immediate
placement in [residential treatment facilities] upon finding of eligibility does not
appear to be reasonable or practical." 1
50
The courts seem to have developed a separate set of criteria for determining
whether "waiver" services are being provided with reasonable promptness.
Unlike the services that the Medicaid statute requires states to provide,'
5'
"waiver" services-like Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS)
programs for beneficiaries with developmental disabilities-are allowed to have
a 'Cap. ' ' 52 This means that states are allowed to establish a fixed number of
"slots" to allocate among the entire beneficiary population, so long as that fixed
number is above a minimum number specified by CMS. Each beneficiary who
gets a slot receives the services provided by the waiver program. Beneficiaries
who do not receive slots are put on a waiting list.153 Thus far, the courts have
held that in order to comply with the Reasonable Promptness Provision in the
context of waiver services, states must allocate empty slots without delay and
provide waiver services to those who receive slots without delay.154 In other
words, states are under no obligation to increase the number of slots for waiver
services, nor are they required to shorten the waiting periods of those waiting for
waiver slots-even if the waiting periods span multiple years. 1
55
As demonstrated above, the regulations and case law related to the
Reasonable Promptness Provision do not provide a clear answer to the question
of what constitutes a violation of reasonable promptness. Perhaps the case law
suggests that a plaintiffs best bet is to draw upon specific numbers from
objective and minimally relevant sources, like the ninety-day figure from the
eligibility determination regulation. However, one district court opinion suggests
another strategy. In Oklahoma Chapter of American Academy of Pediatrics
(OKAAP) v. Fogarty, the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
found that the plaintiffs offered "substantial evidence that the delays in treatment
150. Alexander A. ex rel. Barr v. Novello, Civ.A. No. 99-CV-8418, 210 F.R.D. 27, 37
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002).
151.42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012).
152. See Susan J. v. Riley, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1239 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
153. See id. at 1241 & n.17 (citing Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006)).
154. See, e.g., Susan J., 616 F. Supp. 2d at 1241; Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 275 F. Supp.
2d 1319, 1346 (D.N.M. 2003); Makin ex rel. Russell v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1030 (D.
Haw. 1999).
155. See sources cited supra note 149.
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for children with specific conditions are medically inappropriate."'156 This
evidence convinced the court that the system-wide delays constituted a violation
of the Reasonable Promptness Provision.157 OKAAP, along with the timeliness
standards based on "reasonable standards of medical and dental practice"
required by 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(e), suggest that a plaintiff might be able to
convince a court that a state is violating the Reasonable Promptness Provision by
proving that beneficiaries are having to endure delays that are medically
inappropriate. This standard could be the most commonsensical and thus
intuitively appealing one to judges. It also offers flexibility, as it can be applied
to all conditions and illnesses. Finally, the "medically inappropriate" standard
would create another role for providers to play in suits aimed at forcing states to
raise their Medicaid reimbursement rates: they could provide testimony regarding
the medical consequences of the delays stemming from low reimbursement
levels, thereby helping plaintiffs prove that those delays, and by extension those
low reimbursement rates, constitute violations of the Reasonable Promptness
Provision.
CONCLUSION
In today's economic climate, as Medicaid enrollment expands and state
coffers dwindle, finding a way to prevent states from skimping on Medicaid is
crucial for the health and well-being of our most vulnerable and politically
powerless citizens and residents. Given the current status of § 1983 jurisprudence
and the uncertainty surrounding Medicaid preemption claims, utilizing the
Reasonable Promptness Provision to challenge low Medicaid reimbursement
rates may be just the workaround the doctor ordered.
156. 366 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1109 (N.D. Okla. 2005).
157. Id.
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